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We suggest a quantum cryptographic scheme using continuous EPR-like correlations of bright
optical beams. For binary key encoding, the continuous information is discretized in a novel way by
associating a respective measurement, amplitude or phase, with a bit value ”1” or ”0”. The secure
key distribution is guaranteed by the quantum correlations. No pre-determined information is sent
through the quantum channel contributing to the security of the system.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most advanced
technology in the field of quantum information pro-
cessing. The conventional arrangements use dichotomic
quantum systems to realize the secure information trans-
fer (for a review see [1]). These discrete systems have the
advantage to be in principle loss insensitive in terms of
security. However, the generation process for entangled
photon pairs needed for QKD based on EPR correlations
is spontaneous and therefore probabilistic. This limits
the achievable data transmission rates.
A new development employs continuous variable sys-
tems [2–5], such as intense light fields, to obtain shorter
key distribution times. The security issues of continu-
ous variable quantum cryptography have been addressed
[6,7] and it was proven that the secure key distribution
can be achieved using continuous EPR-type correlation
or quantum squeezed states.
In this Letter we propose a new key distribution
scheme based on the quantum EPR-like correlations of
conjugate continuous variables. The main novel feature
of the protocol [8] is an assignment of a bit value to the
type of measurement. The binary bits are encoded by
the choice to detect either of two conjugate variables ac-
complished independently and randomly by both com-
municating parties. This serves as a discretization of
continuous information in the measurement process. The
coincidences in the choices of both parties are revealed by
testing the EPR-like correlations between the beams and
contribute to the key. Thus, in contrast to other contin-
uous variable systems [2–5], the basis value is not prede-
termined but develops in measurements at receiver and
sender stations, resembling the EPR-based Ekert proto-
col for discrete cryptographic systems. The detection of
light statistics performed by both communicating parties
plays a decisive role in the proposed scheme. It comprises
bit encoding, key sifting, monitoring of the disturbance
in the quantum channel and active control on timing and
information flow during the transmission [9].
The basic ingredient of the scheme are quantum cor-
relations between the amplitude Xˆj = aˆ
†
j + aˆj and phase
Yj = i(aˆ
†
j− aˆj) quadratures of bright beams j = 1, 2. Be-
cause of the high intensity of the optical fields involved,
we use the linearization approach throughout the paper:
Xˆj = 〈Xj〉 + δXˆj, Yˆj = 〈Yj〉 + δYˆj. The entangled ob-
servables are then the quantum uncertainties in the re-
spective field quadratures. We start with the definition
of the relevant measured quantities and of the conditions
for appling the two-mode correlations as a quantum re-
source. It can be done on the basis of the non-separability
criterion for continuous variables [10,11].
The Peres-Horodecki criterion for continuous variables
provides a sufficient condition for a Gaussian state to be
non-separable [10,11]. It can be written in terms of sum
or difference squeezing variances [12] of amplitude and
phase of two beams:
V ±sq (X) =
V (δXˆ1 ± g δXˆ2)
V (Xˆ1,SN + gXˆ2,SN)
, (1)
V ∓sq (Y ) =
V (δYˆ1 ∓ g δYˆ2)
V (Yˆ1,SN + gYˆ2,SN)
(2)
where V (A) is the variance 〈Aˆ2〉 − 〈Aˆ〉2 of an observable
Aˆ. The field modes are denoted by the respective sub-
scripts, SN labels the shot noise limit for a corresponding
beam, and g is a variable gain to minimize the variance
[12]. In the particular case of entirely symmetrical entan-
gled beams the optimal gain is calculated to be g = 1 [11].
The non-separability of the two-mode quantum state re-
quires then V +sq (X) + V
−
sq (Y ) < 2 [10,11] and the crite-
rion is necessary and sufficient [11]. From here on we use
Eqn. (1, 2) with the signs corresponding to amplitude
anti-correlations and phase correlations. The two-mode
non-separable state is said to be squeezed-state entangled
if the following condition is satisfied for the variances of
conjugate variables in Eqs. (1, 2) [13]:
V +sq (X) < 1, V
−
sq (Y ) < 1. (3)
Note, that in contrast to the non-separability crite-
rion, the introduced squeezed-state entanglement re-
quires both variances of conjugate variables to drop be-
low the respective limit. This requirement is crucial for
the suggested cryptographic system and ensures both the
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possibility to build up a binary key string and the secu-
rity of a transmission.
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FIG. 1. QKD with bright EPR-entangled beams (see text).
A key point for the QKD protocol is sum (differ-
ence) measurement(1, 2) testing for the correlation in
the amplitude and phase quadratures. It is used to de-
termine a bit value and it ensures an undisturbed trans-
mission. Suppose Alice and Bob both record the ampli-
tude quadratures of their respective EPR-beam. In this
case the detected quantum uncertainties δˆX1 and δˆX2
are anti-correlated [14]. Bob tests for anti-correlations
by recording the variance of the sum (1) of photo cur-
rents of his and Alice’s measurement. Note, however,
that the time interval used to experimentally determine
the photo current statistics plays a crucial role for the
security of the protocol because it may allow for an unde-
tectable eavesdropping (see below). At this stage we ex-
plain the protocol in terms of squeezing variances for the
sake of clarity in the presentation of main ideas. If there
is a non-local anti-correlation between δX1 and δX2, the
sum photo current will drop below the quantum limit,
V +sq (X) < 1, to the extent dependent on the quality of
the EPR source. Analogously, if there is non-local cor-
relation between δY1 and δY2 the difference photo cur-
rent will drop below the quantum limit V −sq (Y ) < 1 (2).
The quality of the source is limited by the finite degree
of continuous quantum correlations Vsq(X), Vsq(Y ) (1,
2), perfect correlation requiring infinite energy resources.
For the efficiency of transmission, noise and losses in the
quantum channel play a significant role. The net quality
of both the source and the channel has impact on the
distance, on which the quantum correlations are still re-
liably observable, on the sensitivity to the disturbance by
an eavesdropper and on possible achievable bit rates.
The obtained constraint Vsq(X) ≪ 1 and Vsq(Y ) ≪ 1
serve Bob as a criterion for the generation of the sifted
key and as a test for eavesdropping. A measured normal-
ized noise power of Vsq(X)≪ 1 at Bob’s station delivers
a bit value ”1” and Vsq(Y )≪ 1 a bit value ”0”. The ob-
servation of Vsq(X), Vsq(Y ) > 1 means that both parties
have measured different quadratures. These events are
discarded. However, Alice and Bob should keep control-
ling that the overall rate of the event ”no correlation” is
statistically close to 50% as is inherent to the protocol
(X or Y quadrature). Vsq(X), Vsq(Y ) < 1 to an extent
less then expected or no correlations in more than 50%
measurements reveals an unexpected disturbance in the
line. Note, that there is no need to communicate the
obtained constraints Vsq ≪ 1 to Alice.
The quantum key distribution protocol for squeezed-
state entangled bright beams based on the measurement
of the EPR-like correlations works as follows. The EPR-
source is at Alice’s station (Fig. 1). Alice generates and
distributes the entangled beams keeping beam 1 at her
station and sending beam 2 to Bob. The relevant mea-
sured quantities are the quadrature quantum uncertain-
ties which a priori carry no information. To establish the
right timing of their recordings Alice and Bob have to
synchronize their clocks and agree upon a set of time in-
tervals ∆tk in which they subdivide their measurements.
Alice and Bob proceed with a series of measurements.
The expected quality of quantum correlations
Vsq(X), Vsq(Y ) < 1 is determined experimentally as de-
scribed above. Alice and Bob start a key transmission by
performing randomly and independently measurements
of either amplitude quadrature AQ or phase quadrature
PQ each. Hereby they keep recording: 1) their photo cur-
rents (δXˆj , δYˆj), 2) the respective time slots (tk), and 3)
the type of measurement performed (AQ or PQ).
Bob and Alice use two classical communication chan-
nels to evaluate the transmission results. Alice perma-
nently keeps sending the results of her measurements,
the photo current containing δXk2 or δY
k
2 in the time
slots tk, to Bob via a classical channel I. Bob performs
the selection of ”good” bits and the security test. To
generate the sifted key, he checks correlations between
the results of his measurements and the results received
from Alice by recording the variance V +sq (X) (1) of the
sum of the relevant photo currents for his choice of AQ
or the difference variance V −sq (Y ) (2) for PQ.
After evaluating his correlation measurements (Fig. 1),
Bob publicly communicates to Alice via the classical
channel II the time points t1, t3, ..., tk when he detected
correlations (3). The choice of the AQ / PQmeasurement
is not disclosed. At this stage Alice and Bob can generate
the common secret key. They pick up the measurement
type (AQ/PQ) from their recordings at the time points
t1, t3, ..., tk and build the secret key string by association:
AQ = bit value ”1” and PQ= bit value ”0”. They discard
the rest of the data. The presence of Eve will be revealed
by distortion of the correlations or by events ”no corre-
lations” occurring statistically more frequent than 50%.
This protocol is summarized in Table 1.
The security of transmission against eavesdropping is
guaranteed by the sensitivity of the existing correlations
to losses and by the impossibility to measure both con-
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jugate variables simultaneously. The complete security
analysis for the case of continuous variables is non-trivial
and lies beyond the scope of the present Letter. It will be
considered elsewhere in terms of mutual information and
disturbance of transmission [15] and using noise charac-
teristics like signal-to-noise ratio [16,9]. Here we restrict
ourselves to the optical tap attack of an eavesdropper Eve
and for an idealized case of lossless quantum channel to
illustrate the main security mechanisms. The tapping
beam splitter has a transmissivity η.
Table 1: Generation of the ommon seret key string.
Time t
1
t
2
t
3
t
4
. . . t
k
Alie AQ PQ PQ AQ . . . PQ
Bob AQ AQ PQ PQ . . . PQ
Correlation Yes No Yes No . . . Yes
Key 1 { 0 { . . . 0
An eavesdropper Eve will attempt to figure out which
quadrature was measured by Alice by tapping the quan-
tum channel and by trying to relate these measure-
ments to the photo currents travelling from Alice to Bob
through the classical channel. If Eve has decided to de-
tect the amplitude quadrature by tapping, she has at her
disposal the minus and plus channels:
V ∓sq (XE;ZA) =
V (δXˆE ∓ gE δZˆA)
V (XˆE,SN + ZˆA,SN)
, ZˆA = XˆA, YˆA. (4)
Subscripts E,A denote the quantum uncertainties, mea-
sured respectively by Eve and by Alice, upper (lower)
sign refers to the minus (plus) channel, and gE is a vari-
able gain used by Eve. To construct the secret key, Eve
must be able to distinguish between two possible events:
δZˆA = δXˆA or δZˆA = δYˆA. An effective strategy for Eve
is to check the difference between her plus and minus
channels ∆ = V −sq (XE;ZA)− V +sq (XE;ZA). No difference
between recordings in these two channels reveals to Eve
that she and Alice have measured different quadratures.
If Eve records a significant difference ∆, she knows that
she and Alice have measured the same quadrature:
∆ = V −sq (XE ;XA)− V +sq (XE ;XA) = (5)
gE
√
(1− η) [V +sq (X) + V −sq (X)
]
.
Here V +sq (X) is the normalized sum photo current noise
for the amplitude quadratures measured by Alice and
Bob during the undisturbed transmission. It is given by
the squeezing variance [Eq. (1)] with the optimal gain
g = gsq = 1. V
−
sq (X) [Eq. (1)] is the difference photo
current noise which is recorded in Bob’s minus channel
for an amplitude measurement. If the beams of Alice and
Bob are anti-correlated in the amplitude quadrature, the
variance V +sq (X) is well below unity. Due to the quan-
tum penalty the complimentary variance V −sq (X) exhibits
then substantial excess noise. Equation (5) thus shows
that though Eve can split off a small fraction of the signal
and process arbitrarily her measurement results which
are classical photo currents, she will be limited by in-
herent noise present in the signal. Eve can amplify her
signal using the electronic gain gE but it will not improve
the signal-to-noise ratio of the detected light field.
We discuss now which means Alice and Bob have at
their disposal to reveal the malicious disturbance caused
by Eve in the quantum channel. First, we review an-
other criterion for quantum EPR-like correlations intro-
duced by Reid and Drummond [12]. For the discussions
about this EPR condition and about the nonseparabil-
ity criterion see [17,13] and references therein. The EPR
criterion refers to the demonstration of the EPR paradox
for continuous variables and specifies the ability to infer
”at a distance” either of the two non-commuting signal
observables with a precision below the vacuum noise level
of the signal beam [12]. The relevant inference errors [12]
at the optimal gain are the conditional variances:
V ±cond(X1|X2) =
V (δXˆ1 ± g δXˆ2)
V (Xˆ1,SN)
(6)
V ∓cond(Y1|Y2) =
V (δYˆ1 ∓ g δYˆ2)
V (Yˆ1,SN)
. (7)
The demonstration of the EPR paradox for continuous
variables [12,18,14] corresponds to:
V +cond(X1|X2) V −cond(Y1|Y2) < 1. (8)
An interesting tool to control the quantum channel is the
variable gain g in definition of these conditional variances
V ±cond(X1|X2) [Eqn. (1, 6)].
Let us consider first the undisturbed transmission with
an example of the amplitude measurement performed
by Bob. Even for symmetrical squeezed-state entangled
beams the optimal gain to minimize the conditional vari-
ance V +cond(X1|X2) [Eq. (6)] differs from unity. It can be
expressed as:
gcond =
V −sq (X)− V +sq (X)
V −sq (X) + V
+
sq (X)
. (9)
With V +sq (X)→ 0, the noise variance in the minus chan-
nel V −sq (X)→∞ and the optimal gain for V +cond(X1|X2)
is also approaching unity gcond → 1, like the optimal gain
for the squeezing variances [Eqn. (1, 6)].
Consider now, how the invasion of an eavesdropper
is reflected in the measurements at Bob’s station. The
sum photo current measured by Bob, V +sq (X ; η), becomes
more noisy in the presence of Eve:
V +sq (X ; η) =
(1 +
√
η)2
4
V +sq (X) (10)
+
(1−√η)2
4
V −sq (X) +
1− η
2
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containing V −sq (X)≫ 1. Analogously, the signal in Bob’s
minus channel, i. e. the variance V −sq (X ; η), will be also
changed, both plus and minus channel approaching the
same limit. Note that Eve should be cautious enough to
keep the classical amplitude of Bob’s signal unchanged.
Bob uses, therefore, the unchanged value of the shot noise
level to which the measured noise variances are normal-
ized to obtain Vsq corresponding to gsq = 1.
The modified noise variances in the plus and minus
channel V ±sq (X ; η) will be reflected in the optimal gain to
minimize the conditional variance gcond (9):
gcond(η) =
V −sq (X)− V +sq (X)
V −sq (X) + V
+
sq (X)
√
η . (11)
This gain also minimizes the observed unnormalized noise
variance V (δXˆ1 ± g δXˆ2). If Bob monitors gcond(η) (11)
in his measurements, he can easily infer η 6= 1 in the
quantum channel.
An important issue is the finite time for the confident
experimental determination of the squeezing variance.
To gain some partial information, when decoding Vsq Eve
might go for less time than both legitimate communicat-
ing parties, accepting less confidence in determining the
variance. She will tap the signal for a fraction of Bob’s
measurement time and hence will introduce less distur-
bance as expected for a given beam splitting ratio. The
losses in the channel reduce the correlations and enhance
the time needed for the determination of the variance
with sufficient precision. If Eve is tapping close to Alice,
where the impact of losses is still negligible, she can addi-
tionally profit from less time needed for her measurement
compared to that of Bob with a given confidence level.
The optimum strategy for Alice and Bob seems to be to
operate with as short a measurement time as possible,
ultimately with single measurements. The above statis-
tical analysis in terms of variances should therefore be
extended to cope with single shot measurements. This,
however, is beyond the scope of discussion presented here
and will be considered in detail elsewhere.
To summarize, the scheme presented here possesses
several novel features and shows the strong sides of con-
tinuous variable cryptography. The effect of losses on the
maximum possible transmission distance will have to be
studied further. The bit value is encoded by the type of
measurement, i. e. by the choice of measured observable
amplitude or phase. The information on the key is thus
emerging only ”a posteriori”, at sender and receiver sta-
tions. One of the advantages of the presented scheme is
the high value of the achievable effective bit rates. For
example, for the pulsed EPR source the principle theo-
retical limit is given by half of the repetition rate Rrep,
the factor 1
2
being inherent to the protocol and realistic
values of Rrep reaching up to 100 GHz. The implemen-
tation of the scheme with bright EPR-entangled beams
[14] is experimentally simple and robust and well suited
for both fiber-integrated or free-space transmission.
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